基于事件逻辑的改进型Helsinki协议的形式化分析

FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED HELSINKI PROTOCOL BASED ON LOGIC OF EVENTS

  • 摘要: 安全协议是现代网络通信的基础,证明协议的安全性问题是当今研究热点之一。事件逻辑是一种基于事件系统证明协议安全属性的形式化方法,结合事件类以及事件序语言,利用原子类型表示随机数、密钥等不可猜测的数据,能有效刻画协议系统。针对改进型Helsinki协议的安全性问题,对事件逻辑扩充谓词Fresh和FirstSend及其推理规则,利用扩充后的事件逻辑对协议进行形式化分析,首先对协议构建基本序列,然后通过事件逻辑对协议的认证性以及秘密性进行形式化规约,最后利用公理系统和推理规则证明改进型Helsinki协议满足认证性和秘密性。结果表明事件逻辑理论能有效证明安全协议的认证性和秘密性。

     

    Abstract: The security protocols are the basis of modern network communication, and the issue of proving the security of protocols is one of the current research hotspots. The logic of events theory (LoET) is a formal method for proving the security properties of protocols based on event system. Using the language of event orderings and event classes, and using a type of atoms to represent unguessable data, such as nonces, keys, etc., the protocol system is characterized effectively. Aimed at the security problem of the improved Helsinki protocol, predicate Fresh, FirstSend and their rules were extended in LoET, and the extended logic was used to analyze the protocol formally. Basic sequence of the protocol was constructed, and the authentication and secrecy of the protocol were formalized by LoET. The axiom system and rules were used to prove that the improved Helsinki protocol satisfied authentication and secrecy. The results show the effectiveness of LoET for proving the properties of authentication and secrecy.

     

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